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Abstract The emergent new science of synthetic
biology is challenging entrenched distinctions be-
tween, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural
and the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and
even the material and the informational. Whenever
such culturally sanctioned boundaries are breached,
researchers are inevitably accused of playing God or
treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps. Bioethicists,
theologians and editors of scientific journals feel
obliged to provide an authoritative answer to the
ambiguous question of the ‘meaning’ of life, both as a
scientific definition and as an explication with wider
existential connotations. This article analyses the
arguments mooted in the emerging societal debates
on synthetic biology and the way its practitioners
respond to criticism, mostly by assuming a defiant
posture or professing humility. It explores the rela-
tionship between the ‘playing God’ theme and the
Frankenstein motif and examines the doctrinal status
of the ‘playing God’ argument. One particularly
interesting finding is that liberal theologians generally
deny the religious character of the ‘playing God’
argument—a response which fits in with the curious
fact that this argument is used mainly by secular
organizations. Synthetic biology, it is therefore
maintained, does not offend so much the God of the
Bible as a deified Nature. While syntheses of artificial
life forms cause some vague uneasiness that life may
lose its special meaning, most concerns turn out to be
narrowly anthropocentric. As long as synthetic
biology creates only new microbial life and does not
directly affect human life, it will in all likelihood be
considered acceptable.
Keywords Anthropocentrism.Frankenstein.
Hubris.Meaningoflife.PlayingGod
Life on the Drawing Board
Synthetic biology is ‘the code name for engineering
using the machinery of the cell, from tinkering with
existing organisms all the way to the design of life
from scratch’ ([41]: 11). In the wake of the transition
of biology from a taxonomy-based to an information-
based discipline, ‘[synthetic] biologists dream of
controlling the machinery of life like engineers
control device layouts on a computer chip’ (ibid.: 10).
Among those intent upon giving life a complete
makeover, the well-known researcher J. Craig Venter
appears unrivalled in his capacity to attract venture
capital. He and his team are working on a long-term
project involving the transplantation of ‘minimal’
genomes (i.e. genomes stripped of all dispensable
Nanoethics (2009) 3:257–268
DOI 10.1007/s11569-009-0079-6
H. van den Belt (*)
Applied Philosophy Group, Wageningen University,
Hollandseweg 1,
6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands
e-mail: henk.vandenbelt@wur.nlgenes) made from synthesized DNA into host cells
whose genomes have been removed. The artificial
creatures thus obtained will then be used as a ‘chassis’
upon which all kinds of economically useful genes
can be mounted. ‘We’re moving from reading the
genetic code to writing it’, Venter himself explains
[50]. On 31 May 2007 he caused a stir when the US
Patent and Trademark Office published the patent
application his institute had filed on the creation and
various useful applications of a new life form called
Mycoplasma laboratoriums (J. [33]). The claims are
very broadly formulated; specific mention is made of
the creation of new synthetic organisms for the
production of biofuels like hydrogen and ethanol. At
present, such applications may sound futuristic, but
Venter,it seems, wantsto send a message to thegeneral
public that his enterprises (not only the non-profit J.
Craig Venter Institute but also the company Synthetic
Genomics, Inc.; all patent rights will be assigned to the
latter) intend to play a key role in solving the urgent
problems of energy supply and climate change.
Though the spotlight of publicity seems to be
trained on Venter, he is not the only person who is
active in the emerging field of synthetic biology. A
growing clique of young enthusiasts is clustering
around such luminaries as Tom Knight, Drew Endy,
Jay Keasling and George Church, who specialize in
designing and constructing artificial biological sys-
tems, ideally ‘from scratch’, and who thereby take a
more bottom-up approach to synthetic biology [21,
44]. In their view, the implementation of this task
calls for standardization [26]. Leading synthetic
biology researchers from MIT, Harvard and California
are busily engaged in building a ‘library’ (or
‘catalogue’) of interchangeable standard parts called
‘BioBricks’, or pieces of DNA with known functions,
from which practitioners can draw at will to construct
new life forms. By putting together carefully selected
building blocks it is possible to design genetic circuits
capable of regulating successive reaction steps in
metabolic pathways for the production of valuable
substances within the cell. The insertion of such
circuits in a microbial host organism can turn the
latter into a tiny biochemical factory.
Controlling Life: Continuities and Cultural Impacts
The rise of synthetic biology can be seen as a
continuation, and interim culmination, of some
longer-term trends that are characteristic of major
strands in the development of western science and
technology.
Historians of science have pointed out that in
embracing the engineering ideal of ‘controlling life’
contemporary synthetic biologists may be regarded as
heirs to the visionary American biologist Jacques
Loeb, who was pursuing a similar ambition as early as
1900 [5, 12, 40, 45]. Loeb advocated a ‘technology of
living substance’, which would enable man to act as a
creator of new life forms.
For some, the ambition to control is inextricably
linked with the ‘reconceptualization of biological life
[...] as informational’, in parallel with a similar
conviction in nanotechnology that ‘the physical world
can be manipulated as if it were information’ ([36]:
104). Synthetic biology can indeed be seen as the
culmination of a long-standing and still ongoing trend
of progressive ‘informatization’ of the biological
world. The informational view of life that has
dominated molecular biology since Watson and Crick
unravelled the structure of DNA in 1953 is increas-
ingly being materialized in tangible technological
applications, even to the point of blurring the
distinction between living matter and information
[59].
The historical roots of synthetic biology can be
traced even farther back. Several practitioners justify
their new field by quoting the famous statement by
physicist Richard Feynman: ‘What I cannot create I
do not understand’ ([44]: 61).
1 Feynman’s dictum
echoes similar statements by eighteenth-century
luminaries such as Giambattisto Vico (‘verum et
factum convertuntur’ or the true and the made are
convertible) and Immanuel Kant (‘reason has insight
only into what it itself produces according to its own
plan’; see [35]: 19). The idea that there is a very close
connection between knowing and making, between
understanding an object and the ability to create or
(re-)assemble it, is not at all foreign to the tradition of
western science and philosophy. An interesting
illustration of what one could dub the Vico-Kant-
Feynman Principle is provided by nineteenth-century
synthetic organic chemistry ([7]: 168). In several
1 See also the following statement by two synthetic biologists:
‘Until we can assemble a form of life in vitro from defined,
functionally understood macromolecules and small molecule
substrates, how can we say that we understand the secret of
life?’ ([28]: 5).
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precursor to present-day synthetic biology. No wonder
then that some contemporary practitioners attempt to
draw heuristic lessons from this example [6, 63].
Synthetic biology may also have inherited some of
the cultural ambivalences and reservations pertaining
to the ‘natural-versus-artificial’ dichotomy from
synthetic chemistry [59].
Synthetic biology adopts the epistemological
approach of synthetic chemistry, but pursues it with
the resources of modern information technology. In
informational terms, Feynman’s dictum boils down to
Von Neumann’s motto ‘If you can’t compute it you
don’t understand it!’.
2 New life forms can be designed
by writing ‘programs’ in the quaternary ‘code’ of the
four DNA nucleotides. Hence, the work of synthetic
biologists also resembles that of software designers.
The ‘informatization’ of the biological world may
have a disenchanting effect on our view of life. Life
itselfisincreasinglyunderstoodintermsof‘information
processing’ or ‘computation’ and cells and organisms
areseenascomputersthatcanbeeasily(re)programmed
according to our wishes. Rather than evolving naturally,
living beings become the product of deliberate design.
Many are worried that life will lose its special meaning
when such reductionist views prevail. A case in point is
the way living organisms are considered in patent law.
The European Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions (Directive 98/44/EC)
gives the following definition of the key object of
protection: ‘... “biological material” means any mate-
rial containing genetic information and capable of
reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological
system’ (art. 2.1 sub a). Notice that not just genes and
cells but complete organisms can be brought under this
definition. During political debates on the implemen-
tation of the Directive in the Netherlands in 2003–
2004, several members of parliament expressed
concern that the new legislation would reduce living
beings to the status of biological material. In response
to this concern, cabinet ministers pointed out that “all
living beings consist of biological material, but of
course are more than just biological material” ([25], 23
ff). This facile defence is rather disingenuous, however,
as organisms clearly meet the definition of ‘biological
material’ given in the Directive and on that count must
be held to be such material (besides, the Directive
declares entire organisms to be patentable). There is no
escape from the conclusion that in modern patent law
plants and animals are being reduced to the status of
raw material or carrier of genetic information.
Synthetic biology puts heavy pressure on many of
the culturally entrenched distinctions and demarca-
tions that are constitutive of our symbolic order. It
shifts or blurs the boundaries between matter and
information, life and non-life, nature and artefact,
organic and inorganic, Creator and creature, the
evolved and the designed. In science and technology
studies, entities that challenge the settled boundaries
of nature and society are often designated as
‘monsters’ [34]. Like the creations of synthetic
biology, Victor Frankenstein’s creature was a prime
example of a ‘monster’ in this particular sense.
3
Whenever culturally sanctioned boundaries are
breached by such ‘monsters’, researchers are quickly
accused of playing God or of treading in Frankenstein’s
footsteps. Indeed, in recent times these types of
accusations have triggered societal debates on the moral
andsymbolicimplicationsofsynthetic biologyinwhich
the question about the ‘meaning’ of life has also found a
prominent place. By following the tropes of ‘playing
God’ and emulating Frankenstein in their discursive
settings, I therefore alsohope togain a useful contextual
angle from which to deal with the latter question.
Playing God and Following Frankenstein
Responding to the news that Craig Venter and his team
had filed for a patent on Mycoplasma laboratorium,t h e
leader of the ETC Group, Pat Mooney, declared in
June 2007:
‘For the first time, God has competition. Venter
and his colleagues have breached a societal
2 Von Neumann’s motto has inspired the scientific work of
molecular biologist Sydney Brenner ([9]: 141).
3 ‘Shelley’s “monster” is something new in world literature, a
being which disturbs the very categories by which we make
logical sense of the world: reality and fantasy, being and non-
being, life and death, natural and constructed, organic and
artificial, animate and inanimate. Victor will continue to
produce a series of nominations for his creature (including
“fiend”, “abortion”, “daemon”, “spectre”, “vampire”, “devil”,
“vile insect”, “detested form” and so on) because, as Shelley
well knew, there are no authentic names for a being who
questions the very logical categories created by human
language’ ([2]: 52).
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chance to debate the far-reaching social, ethical
and environmental implications of synthetic
life.’ [27].
This statement seems particularly apt with regard
to synthetic biology. However, it is definitely not the
first time that an assertion of this or a similar kind has
been made. It sounds rather hackneyed to say that
man is playing God. The recombinant-DNA debate in
the 1970s already gave rise even then to a book
entitled Playing God [29]. In recent decades this
accusation has been levelled innumerable times at
classical biotechnologists (e.g. [48]). Similarly,genetic
engineering in its classical form has been charged with
breaching critical boundaries. For members of the ETC
Group, apparently, such considerations fail to constitute
apersuasivereasontoabstainfromhammeringthesame
message home time and again, as is shown by the
frequency with which the expression ‘playing God’
continues to appear in their publications and press
releases (see for instance [52]). This is not at all
surprising. Journalists also tend to resort to this
metaphor when reporting new developments in the life
sciences. When, for example, back in 1999 Business
Week discussed Venter’s newly initiated research on the
minimal genome, it chose the title ‘Playing God in the
Lab’ [13]. And in May 2007 Newsweek printed a lead
story on synthetic biology, with a portrait of a
thoughtful, upward-looking Craig Venter adorning the
cover alongside the boldly printed words ‘Playing
God’. This expression has meanwhile become, as
publicist and science journalist Philip Ball remarks, a
lazy journalistic cliché and an alarmist slogan [4].
However, it is a cliché that may still enable writers or
NGOs to attract the attention of a large audience.
In discussions on biotechnology and synthetic
biology, alongside and in combination with allusions to
the presumed arrogance of playing God, a name is very
often invoked that many scientists consider a tainted
‘F-word’: Frankenstein. In fact, the Frankenstein theme
is closely entwined with the motif of playing God. As
Mary Shelley herself wrote in 1831 in the introduction
to her gothic novel Frankenstein; or, The Modern
Prometheus: ‘Frightful must it be; for supremely
frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour
to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of
the world.’ ([53]: 9). The main character of the novel,
Victor Frankenstein, ultimately brought disaster upon
himself and his loved ones by indulging in the
‘unhallowed arts’ of ‘bestowing animation upon
lifeless matter’ (ibid.:5 3 ) .H ea s p i r e d‘to become
greater than his nature [would] allow’ (ibid.:5 4 ) .I n
o t h e rw o r d s ,F r a n k e n s t e i nw a n t e dt op l a yG o da n d
was as severely punished for his transgression as
Prometheus, who had stolen fire from the gods. As
a Dutch literary critic succinctly explains: ‘The
moral seems clear, and is more relevant than ever
in the 21st century, which is dominated by the
advancing genetic and bio-technologies: do not
play God and beware of the dangers of technology’
[55]. In his book Frankenstein’s Footsteps,J o n
Turney calls the story of Frankenstein ‘the governing
myth of modern biology’ ([58]: 3). Mary Shelley
herself took pains to point out that the theme of her
gothic novel was not entirely the product of her
own imagination. In fact, the subject matter
resonated with scientific ideas that had circulated
around 1800, such as Erasmus Darwin’sv i e w so n
the ‘spontaneous generation’ of life
4 and Luigi
Galvani’s ideas of using electricity to animate
lifeless matter:
‘Perhaps a corpse would be re-animated;
galvanism had given token of such things:
perhaps the component parts of a creature
4 In the 1831 introduction to her novel, Mary Shelley referred
to the conversations in the summer of 1816 between Lord
Byron and Percy Shelley about Erasmus Darwin’s experiments:
‘They talked of the experiments of Dr Darwin, (I speak not of
what the Doctor really did, or said that he did, but, as more to
my purpose, of what was then spoken of as having been done
by him), who preserved some piece of vermicelli in a glass
case, till by some extraordinary means it began to move with
voluntary motion.’ ([53], 9). The story of a piece of ‘vermicelli’
that suddenly became alive sounds quite incredible, but the
term may mean ‘little worms’ as well as refer to a species of
Italian pasta. In an editorial note to Erasmus Darwin’s
philosophical poem Temple of Nature, Martin Priestman
unravels the tangle of confusions ([16] [1803]; Editor’s Note
1.247). In an Additional Note to his poem, entitled ‘Spontane-
ous Vitality of Microscopic Animals’, Erasmus Darwin had
reported on the research done by previous scholars on the
subject of spontaneous generation: ‘By the experiments of
Buffon, Reaumur, Ellis, Ingenhouz, and others, microscopic
animals are produced in three or four days, according to the
warmth of the season, in the infusions of all vegetable or animal
matter. One or more of these gentlemen put some boiling veal
broth into a phial previously heated in the fire, and sealing it up
hermetically or with melted wax, observed it to be replete with
animalcules in three or four days.’ ([16] [1803], Canto 1,
Additional Note 1).
260 Nanoethics (2009) 3:257–268might be manufactured, brought together, and
endued with vital warmth.’ ([53]: 8).
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This brief summary cannot possibly do justice to
the many subtleties and layers of meaning that lie
hidden in Mary Shelley’s novel. In the popular
imagination, based more on retellings and especially
on Hollywood movies than on the original novel, the
Frankenstein story has been reduced to the straight-
forward, one-dimensional tale of a mad scientist who
created a hideous and rampaging monster. The
original story has been turned into the ‘Frankenstein
myth’ [58] and much of the ambiguity of the novel
has been lost. One of the effects of this process is that
Victor Frankenstein’s noble intentions, including his
wish ‘to banish disease from the human frame and
render man invulnerable to any but a violent death’
([53]: 42) have been eclipsed. Some interpreters have
drawn attention to other neglected aspects of the
novel. Langdon Winner and Stephen Jay Gould argue
that Frankenstein’s greatest moral failure was that he
refused to take proper responsibility and care for the
creature he himself had put into this world ([62]: 306–
314; [30]). Ellen ter Gast, finally, identifies Franken-
stein’s secretiveness and his refusal to communicate
with his scientific colleagues and the wider public as a
further shortcoming ([56]: 116, 132).
Frankenstein is a recurrent reference point in
modern debates on biotechnology and synthetic
biology. Bioethicist Bernard Rollin, for example,
referred to the Frankenstein story when discussing
the ethical and social aspects of animal biotechnology
[51]. At the height of the British food scare around
genetically modified foods in 1998, the Prince of Wales
single-handedly poured oil on troubled waters by
launching the term ‘Frankenfoods’. Mary Shelley’s
creature is yet again unearthed in connection with
synthetic biology. Hope Shand and her co-authors refer
to Craig Venter under the heading ‘Dr Frankenstein, I
presume’ [52]. Incidentally, in 1999, when discus-
sing his plans to construct an artificial bacterium
with a minimal genome, Venter himself declared
with some bravado: ‘Shelley would have loved
this!’ ([18]: 110). However, forewarned by the
furore caused by Dolly the cloned sheep, he was
smart enough to first solicit ethical advice from a
panel of leading bioethicists and theologians which
he himself installed, the so-called Ethics of
Genomics Group led by Arthur Caplan and Mildred
Cho. In the event, the panel saw no fundamental
objections against Venter’s plans to construct a
minimal genome and eventually delivered the
desired positive advice [15, 64]. Ironically, journalist
Chris Mooney commented that Victor Frankenstein
could have saved himself a lot of trouble, had he
conducted his affairs in the same smart way as
Venter:
‘If only Victor Frankenstein had had some
media savvy, he might have been J. Craig
Venter. Rather than living in dread of his
appalling creature, he could have assembled a
panel of bioethicists and theologians to bless it,
applied for a Swiss government grant to
research it, and hired an investment bank to
explore an initial public offering—FrankenCell
Inc.—to exploit the results of his research’ [42].
Venter is indeed a pre-eminent example of the
modern ‘bio-entrepreneur’, who deftly combines
scientific and commercial objectives [57]. To Victor
Frankenstein, however, ‘wealth was an inferior
object’ ([53]: 42).
Although the name of Mary Shelley’s tragic hero is
invoked in connection with classical biotechnology as
well as with synthetic biology, Philip Ball takes the
view that the comparison with Frankenstein’s unhal-
lowed arts seems much more appropriate for the latter
field:
‘Compared with conventional biotechnology
and genetic engineering, the risks involved
in synthetic biology are far scarier. Whether
you approve of them or not, GMOs are more
like patients with an organ transplant than
Frankenstein’s monster. There is no sense in
which genetic engineers are ‘making life’—but
that is what synthetic biologists propose to do, if
indeed they have not already done so’ [3].
Ball later went back on this statement, as we will
see below.
Between Humility and Defiance
ToavoidunwelcomeassociationswithDrFrankenstein’s
pursuits and to escape the charge of playing God, many
5 For more information on ‘galvanistic’ experiments performed
in Mary Shelley’s time, see [39]: 11–17.
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and deny that their activities resemble anything that
might come close to ‘creating’ or ‘making’ life. Thus
MIT Professor George Church elaborates on the pur-
portedly humble comparison of synthetic biologists with
simple engineers, even if he does not seem entirely
willing to give up the coveted epithet of ‘intelligent
designers’:
‘We’re acting as engineers, possibly as intelligent
designers. The religiously-inclined would not put
humans in the same league with the “Intelligent
Designer”,orGo d.Ascr ea ti veaswebe co me ,an d
as industrious and as good as we are at designing
and manufacturing living things, which we’ve
been doing since the stone age—no matter how
good we get at that, it’s like calling a candle a
supernova. A candle is not a supernova; it’sn o t
even in the same league. And we, as intelligent
designers, are not in the same league as the
“Intelligent Design” forces that started the whole
shebang.We’renotdesigningsub-atomicparticles
from scratch; we’re not designing galaxies. We’re
really not even designing the basic idea of life;
we’re just manipulating it.’ ([10]; my italics).
To which one might reply that in this sense Victor
Frankenstein was not designing life (let alone the idea
of life) ‘from scratch’ either: ‘The dissecting room
and the slaughterhouse furnished many of my
materials (...)’ ([53]: 55). If the construction of
artificial life forms only deserves to be called creation
of life when it is created literally out of nothing
(creatio ex nihilo), then we can be pretty sure that this
elusive aim will never be achieved. But wasn’t Adam
formed from the dust of the earth?
Belatedly, Venter also takes a more modest stance.
While he used to compare himself with Frankenstein,
he now insists that he is not in the business of creating
life, but is merely engaged in ‘modifying life to come
up with new life forms’ [8]. Perhaps with the cover
page of Newsweek in mind, he now dismisses any
suggestion that he is trying to play God as ‘media
sensationalism’ (ibid.). His collaborator Hamilton
Smith once gave a less timid and less evasive reply
to the charge that he was playing God: ‘We don’t
play’. Equally defiant is the response of James
Watson, the doyen of molecular biology, to the same
allegation: ‘If scientists don’t play God, who else is
going to?’ [1]. For the ETC Group, such declarations
simply expose the incurable hubris from which many
molecular and synthetic biologists suffer [52].
It seems that synthetic biologists can switch rather
easily from a posture of defiance or arrogance to a
posture of humility and back again. Commenting on
debates on nanotechnology, the French philosopher
Jean-Pierre Dupuy notes that scientists often oscillate
between ‘two opposed attitudes: on the one hand,
vainglory, an excessive and often indecent pride; and
on the other, when it becomes necessary to silence
critics, a false humility that consists of denying that
one has done anything that departs from the usual
business of normal science’ [24]. As a philosopher,
Dupuy says he is less disturbed by ‘a science that
claims to be the equal of God’ than by a ‘false
humility’ that actually denies the essential distinction
between life and non-life (ibid.). It seems to me that it
might be helpful to consider the two contrasting
postures, arrogance and humility, as different registers
from the same rhetorical repertoire, which scientists
can play according to the demands of the situation.
6 If
the situation demands that critics be silenced, scien-
tists will indeed play the register of humility.
When, in a recent interview, Drew Endy was asked
if the creation of new life forms should not be left to
God, he played the register of humility with aplomb:
‘I don’t view [my research] projects as creating
life, but rather [as] construction projects. For me
as an engineer, there is a big difference between
the words creation and construction. Creation
implies I have unlimited power, perfect under-
standing of the universe, and the ability to
manipulate matter at a godlike level. That’s not
what I have. I have an imperfect understanding,
a budget, limited resources, and I can only
manipulate things quite crudely. In that context,
with those constraints, I’m a more humble
constructor.’ [49]
6 Georgiana Kirkham notes that the defence of alchemy during
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance already oscillated
between a ‘more modest view’, which saw the alchemist’s
work as merely imitating nature, and a ‘more optimistic view’,
which it as allowing human beings to surpass nature. She
recognizes the same ambivalence in justifications of modern
biotechnology: ‘While it seems inconsistent to put forward both
these conceptions at the same time, they remain as conflated
now as they were in the Middle Ages and early modern period’
([38]: 77).
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Given the seemingly religious character of the ‘playing
God’ argument, we might expect theologians to be able
to enlighten us about its precise status from a doctrinal
point of view. In this regard Ted Peters, Professor of
Systematic Theology at Berkeley, California, has a
surprise for us in store. He claims that ‘playing God’ is
by no means a theological term; on the contrary, it
articulates a secular rather than a religious vision ([46]:
2a n d1 3 ;[ 47]). He also sees no principled objections
of a religious nature against making new life forms:
‘What Venter is doing is an extremely complicated
form of animal breeding. We’re going to be changing
the face of the planet no matter what. The question is
do we want to do it responsibly or not?’ [8]. The Ethics
of Genomics Group, the panel of bioethicists and
theologians installed by Venter, also rejected quasi-
religious objections against far-reaching human inter-
ference with life processes: ‘Too often, concern about
“playing God” has become a way of forestalling rather
than fostering discussion about morally responsible
manipulation of life.’ ([15], 2088).
Obviously, such responses come from more latitu-
dinarian schools of thought. One notion that cannot
be simply rejected out of hand is that the members of
Venter’s ethical panel may have been chosen partly
because of their liberal views. Needless to say, there
are also more orthodox views in religious circles. A
liberal theologian like Ted Peters would not pretend to
speak on behalf of all believers. In this connection the
expositions of the Dutch theologian Frits de Lange on
the doctrinal differences between orthodox and
heterodox views are particularly illuminating, even
though he confines his discussion to the various
denominations within Protestantism. De Lange dis-
tinguishes between the restoration model of redemp-
tion, which is endorsed by orthodox Protestants and
which considers redemption as a return to the
situation before the Fall, and the liberal model of
redemption, which sees redemption as the completion
or perfection of Creation. The latter model is
characterized as follows:
‘Creation is not a separate act of God in the
beginning, but an ongoing, dynamic process in
history (creatio continua). Sinfulness in this
connection is just the blockage that occurs when
salvation is frustrated by people. Ethics here is
forward-looking. The good creation can be
better; it is still before us. It is the future that
supplies the norm, not the past.’ [20].
In this view the relationship between creator and
creature is such that man can be promoted to the
position of creator next to God; he is, in the words of
the Lutheran theologian Philip Hefner, ‘created co-
creator’ [32].
7 De Lange points out that such religious
beliefs lead to a largely unrestrained optimism with
regard to the possibilities of genetic technologies:
‘[Ted] Peters often goes so far as to suggest that
almost anything that can be done technologically is
also morally acceptable, as long as it is “good” for
people’ [20]. Orthodox Protestants would rather be
guided by the idea that man is inclined to all evil and
incapable of doing any good. De Lange summarizes
the two positions as follows:
‘Whoever considers Creation as creatio continua
and man in this connection as created co-creator
[...] will subscribe to liberal and progressive
bioethics. Whoever emphasizes the weight of
sinfulness and accentuates the discontinuity
between human history and God’sc u l m i n a t i o n ,
on the other hand, will defend a more restrictive
ethics and rather point to the risks and hazards
involved in tampering with hereditary structures.’
(ibid.).
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the ‘progres-
sive’ views of liberal theologians from the metaphysical
ruminations of synthetic biologists. MIT Professor
George Church, for one, provides a slightly secularized
version of the theological doctrine that man can act as a
created co-creator:
‘We seem to be “designed” by nature to be good
designers. In that sense we’re part of some huge
recursive design, but we’re not doing something
we’re not designed (and microevolved) to do.
Engineering is one of the main things that
humans do well. [...] It’s just what we do and
it’s natural.’ [10]
7 Similar notions can also be found in (liberal) Judaism: ‘As
Jewish ethicist Elliot Dorff points out, people are God’s
partners in the ongoing act of creation when we improve our
lot in life’ [19]. Here too this view leads to ‘optimism in the
face of scientific uncertainty about unanticipated consequences’
(ibid.).
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designer, just as in the eyes of the liberal theologians,
the Creator has created man to be a co-creator. In both
cases, man’s creations, including synthetic life forms,
will be considered natural and acceptable.
What is Life? A Silly Question?
Venter’s bioethical panel also busied itself with the
challenges that synthetic biology raises with regard to
received cultural views on life. In an article published
in Science magazine in December 1999, the panel
stated that the attempt to create a minimal genome
(and by implication the rise of synthetic biology) can
be interpreted as the culmination of a long-standing
reductionist research agenda about the meaning and
origin of life. This (interim) last step, more than any
previous steps, would place the question ‘What is
life?’ at the centre of the debate. As might be
expected, the panel of liberally-minded bioethicists
and theologians did not object to the attempt to create
a minimal genome as such. What they warned
against, however, was the ‘wrong conclusions’ that
researchers, the general public or the press could draw
from such an attempt:
‘There is a serious danger that the identification
and synthesis of minimal genomes will be
presented by scientists, depicted in the press
[reference omitted], or perceived by the public
as proving that life is reducible to or nothing
more than DNA. But life need not be under-
stood solely in terms of what technology permits
scientists to discover. This may threaten the
view that life is special.’ ([15]: 2088; my
italics).
The bioethicists and theologians seem to be
dispensing far too easily with the issue here. In the
near future we may be confronted with situations in
which various new life forms will be routinely
assembled by synthetic biologists as they see fit;
while, according to the panel, we should keep saying
to ourselves that these biological syntheses do not
have any real cultural significance and that life
remains ‘special’ and is certainly not reducible to
‘mere’ DNA. As if the only thing we need to guard
against is that things are presented this way. A very
sanctimonious thought indeed!
Meanwhile, Arthur Caplan, a prominent member of
Venter’s panel, has distanced himself somewhat from
the panel’s appeasing statement. ‘While creating new
life may not be playing God’,s a y sC a p l a n ,‘it has
revolutionary implications for how we see ourselves.
When we can synthesize life, it makes the notion of a
living being less special.’ [14]. Now that our view of
life and our self-image are directly affected by the new
technological potential to make artificial life forms, it
seems that the question is no longer seen as just a
matter of drawing the ‘wrong’ conclusions from such
developments or of the way things are presented.
The scientific journal Nature entered the debate on
the meaning of life with an editorial published on 28
June 2007 under the heading ‘Meanings of “life”’
[43]. As usual, the editorial was unsigned, but in this
particular case we know that the publicist Philip Ball
is responsible for its content, because an earlier
version is posted on his personal blogspot under the
title ‘What is Life? A silly question’ [4]. Ball’s
comment was triggered by the response of the ETC
Group to Venter’s recent scientific feats, in particular
Pat Mooney’s previously quoted statement: ‘For the
first time, God has competition.’ The editorial in
Nature argues that synthetic biology would do us an
immense service if it were to free us once and for all
from the view—branded as ‘vitalism’—that a quali-
tative difference exists between inert and living
matter. Precisely because such a difference does not
exist, the editorial argues, the concomitant notion of
‘creating life’, to which the western cultural tradition,
from the myths of the golem and the homunculus to
the Frankenstein story attaches such great importance,
is ‘close to meaningless’ ([43]: 1032). Even scientists
trying to set up criteria for what constitutes life are
accused of exhibiting a vitalist deviation. We have to
rid ourselves of the idea, the editorial insists, that life
is ‘a precise scientific concept’. Instead, the ‘contex-
tual contingency’ and the ‘ambiguity’ of the term
‘life’ are highlighted. Neither is life a solitary
phenomenon, the editorial further explains, because
cells come together in colonies and organisms in
ecosystems. The editorial finally rejects the religious
dogma according to which a ‘divine spark’ would
turn a fertilized egg into an inherently valuable
embryo. The formation of a new being is gradual,
contingent and precarious. There are no thresholds or
qualitative transitions, let alone moral thresholds:
‘Synthetic biology’s view of life as a molecular
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cell is a powerful one’ ([43]: 1032).
The intervention of Nature in the debate on the
meaning of life is remarkable for several reasons.
Ironically, the editorial draws precisely the conclusion
that, according to Venter’s ethical panel, should not be
drawn from the new scientific and technological
developments, viz., that life is not ‘special’. However,
the editorial also employs post-modern qualifications
such as ‘ambiguous’, ‘contingent’ and ‘contextual’,
which suggest a positive characterization of the
meaning of ‘life’ after all (just as the remark that life
is not a solitary affair can be read with a positive
twist). Furthermore, the question needs to be asked
whether the rejection of thresholds and qualitative
transitions is warranted on purely natural scientific
grounds or whether it stems from a preconceived
dogma that only gradual transitions exist.
8 One might
wonder if Nature’s editorial board would be willing to
reject the rather unique and fairly liberal British
legislation that regulates embryonic stem cell research
on the same grounds. The UK legislation allows stem
cell research on embryos (or rather ‘pre-embryos’)
until the age of 14 days. Proponents justify this age
limit by pointing out that this is the moment when the
so-called primitive streak appears and cells start to
differentiate ([34]: 115). One could say that in this
case an ethical commission (the Warnock Commis-
sion) has given a moral meaning to a ‘natural’
biological transition or marking point. Consistency
would demand that Nature reject this liberal solution.
Conclusion
In the concluding pages of Frankenstein’s Footsteps,
Jon Turney notes that the story of Frankenstein has
outlived its former usefulness and nowadays tends to
foster a sterile polarization of the debate on new
advances in the life sciences. The same could perhaps
be said of the standard objection of ‘playing God’,
which, according to some, has been reduced to a
facile journalistic cliché or an alarmist slogan.
However, it would not be acceptable in a liberal
democracy to ban allusions to the Frankenstein theme
or the ‘playing God’ argument in public debates. If
participants think that these kinds of arguments help
to convey their concerns or promote their cause, they
cannot be prevented from using them.
Still, it may come across as a little weird for
secular organizations like the ETC Group to accuse
synthetic biologists of assuming the role of God (and
only slightly less weird to compare them with Dr
Frankenstein). Indeed, as the Christian philosopher
Gordon Graham notes, ‘... if, as the secular world
believes, there is no God, how could there be any
danger of human beings illegitimately abrogating to
themselves His function?’ ([31]: 145).
9 The Dutch
physicist-cum-theologian Willem B. Drees also notes
that even non-believers often find ‘playing God’ a
useful metaphor in criticizing new technologies ([23]:
651). A possible answer to the paradox of ‘playing
God without God’ may lie in Ted Peters’ hint that the
God of ‘playing God’ is not necessarily the God of
the Bible, but rather ‘deified nature’ ([47]: 383). It is
the presumed sacredness of nature that the modern
life sciences threaten to profane. Also to modern
secular minds, there appear to be lines that may not be
crossed and boundaries that may not be breached (the
phrase used by Pat Mooney in his comment on
Venter’s patent), even in the absence of a god or gods
who have the authority to institute such lines and
boundaries in the first place. Overstepping these
boundaries may be construed as inviting unknown
and unprecedented risks. To accuse scientists of play-
ing God may thus be just another way of alerting the
wider public to the recklessness of their pursuits in the
8 Physicist Paul Davies speaks of the ‘threshold problem’ in
connection with the quest to explain the origin of life: ‘Only
when organic molecules achieve a certain very high level of
complexity can they be considered as “living”, in the sense that
they encode a huge amount of information in a stable form and
not only display the capability of storing the blueprint for
replication but also the means to implement that replication.
The problem is to understand how this threshold could have
been crossed by ordinary physical and chemical processes
without the help of some supernatural agency’ ([17]: 68). It is
thus possible to recognize the existence of a threshold between
inert matter and life without appealing to a life-force or a divine
spark!
9 In a discussion with the militant atheist Richard Dawkins, the
author of The God Delusion, Craig Venter also argued: ‘Where
there is no God, one also cannot play God’ (Venter quoted in
[11]). Earlier in the discussion, Dawkins had declared: ‘I
suspect that the phrase “playing god” is actually a kind of, it’sa
bit like the boy who cried ‘wolf’, because accusing a scientist
of playing god is obviously stupid. But what is not obviously
stupid is accusing a scientist of endangering the future of the
planet by doing something that could be irreversible.’ (Dawkins
quoted in [11]).
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Kirkham writes, ‘[i]n secular formulations, such
phrases [i.e. ‘playing God’ and ‘interfering in Nature’s
plan’] can act as metaphors for mistaking a consider-
able amount of power, knowledge and foresight for
omnipotence and omniscience, and as metaphors for
humans letting their power and knowledge exceed their
caution’ ([37]: 176). You need not be a religious
believer to recognize the dangers of hubris and the
wisdom of the Proverb ‘Pride comes before disaster,
and arrogance before a fall’ (Proverbs 16:18).
There are also Christian believers who are critical
of developments in the life sciences but eschew any
allusion to the argument of ‘playing God’.O n e
example is the Franciscan philosopher Keith Douglass
Warner O.F.M., who deliberately refrains from using
this argument in his attempt to develop a Catholic
ethics on agricultural biotechnology:
‘Religious ethics can play a more constructive
role in the debate on agricultural biotechnology
by addressing [the] patent regime rather than by
raising questions about “playing God” through
genetically engineering germplasm, questions
that are hard to answer and unlikely to be
resolved in industrial societies. The Catholic
social teaching tradition and its principle of the
universal destination of goods fundamentally
conflicts with the negative right conferred by
gene patents.’ ([60]: 316).
Thus Warner arrives at a very critical position with
regard to biotech patents on the basis of the traditional
social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. This
example is quite provocative. One could read this
article as an implicit message from a Catholic priest to
a secular organization like the ETC Group: stop
raising questions about synthetic biologists playing
God, but concentrate your critical effort on question-
ing the legitimacy of their patents! (By the way, in his
public lectures, Venter is conspicuously silent about
the role of patents in synthetic biology.)
It is by no means certain that the ‘playing God’
argument or references to Frankenstein will always
help the groups that question the activities of life
scientists. Although most scientists are quick to deny
that they are attempting to play God or following in
Frankenstein’s footsteps, sometimes the more intrepid
amongthemadoptamoredefiantattitude.Wehaveseen
that at one point Venter invited a comparison of his
team’s work with that of Frankenstein by claiming
‘Shelley would have loved this!’. And James Watson’s
famous retort ‘If scientists don’t play God, who else is
goingto?’maybeanotherdisarmingcounter-strike.The
option of using quasi-religious arguments, for one
purpose or another, is open to all parties in the debate.
So what, finally, about the question of the
‘meaning’ of life? The answer does not lie first
and foremost in a rigorous definition. Indeed, the
whole quest for a scientifically robust definition
that has been triggered by the rise of synthetic
biology is a red herring (cf. [5]: 26–29). What is at
stake is the wider existential connotations of the
question. Are we allowed to create new life at will?
Or should some kind of religious awe prevent us
from emulating Frankenstein? These metaphysical
questions are indeed difficult to deal with. Some
synthetic biologists evade the issue by denying that
their constructions of artificial biological systems
amount to ‘creating life’ at all. Venter’s ethical panel
superficially suggested that the new biological
syntheses would not affect our cultural understand-
ing of the ‘meaning’ of life. It can hardly be denied,
however, that the debate on ‘What is life?’,w h i c h
has been revitalized by the emergence of synthetic
biology, is being largely conducted from a rather
narrow anthropocentric perspective. In other words,
the question about the meaning of life affects us
mainly insofar as it concerns our own life. Thus
Arthur Caplan was primarily concerned about the
potentially revolutionary implications of synthetic
biology ‘for how we see ourselves’. The editorial in
Nature on the meaning of ‘life’ made particular use
of the advances of synthetic biology to score points
against religious views on the moral sanctity of
human embryos. Conversely, when the Vatican
broached the subject of synthetic biology during
the Good Friday meditations of 2006, the endeavour
to ‘modify the very grammar of life’ was exclusively
interpreted in the light of the ‘attack on the family’
allegedly perpetrated by modern secular society [61].
Whenever the subject of synthetic biology is raised
in the media, the debate almost inevitably becomes
focused on possible interventions in human nature
and/or the consequences for human beings. The
ethical debate surrounding the birth of Dolly the
Sheep in 1996 is an earlier example of this narrow
interest: it turned largely on the prospect of cloning
humans. The same anthropocentric focus can be
266 Nanoethics (2009) 3:257–268f o u n di nt h ef o l l o w i n gq u o t a t i o nf r o mL e o nK a s s ,a
conservative bioethicist and former chair of the US
President’s Council on Bioethics, in which he
sketches the effects of the modern life sciences:
‘All of the natural boundaries are up for grabs.
All of the boundaries that have defined us as
human beings, boundaries between a human
being and an animal on one side and between a
human being and a super human being or a god
on the other. The boundaries of life, the
boundaries of death. These are the questions of
the 21st century, and nothing could be more
important.’ (Kass quoted in [54]).
The blurring of the boundary between life and
death, or life and non-life, is regarded as important
only insofar as it concerns one of the boundaries ‘that
have defined us as human beings’. Kass’s statement
was quoted with approval in a newspaper article by
the Dutch molecular biophysicist Cees Dekker, who is
also a committed Christian. Dekker writes that doom-
mongering with regard to future science and technol-
ogy is not opportune and that he is fascinated by the
possibilities of synthetic biology. But the thrust of his
article is directed at the ‘transhumanist’ quest for
human enhancement [22].
Given this overwhelming dominance of anthropocen-
tric concerns, we may hazard a prediction that as long as
synthetic biology confines itself to constructing microbial
biochemical factories, hardly anyone will lose any
sleep overthefact thatthisachievement actually comes
down to creating life. The same ambiguity or hidden
double standard characterizes Mary Shelley’s novel. It
is true that Frankenstein overstepped the mark by
indulging in the unhallowed arts of bestowing anima-
tion on lifeless matter, but his real transgression was
that he sought to create a human being!
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Adams T (2003) The stuff of life. The observer, April 6,
2003. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from: http://www.
guardian.co.uk/education/2003/apr/06/highereducation.uk1
2. Allen G (2008) Shelley’s Frankenstein. Continuum, London
3. Ball P (2004) What is life? Can we make it? Prospect
magazine, vol. 101, August 2004
4. Ball P (2007) ‘What is life? A silly question’ June 26,
2007. Retrieved September 11, 2007, from http://philipball.
blogspot.com/2007_06_01_archive.html
5. Balmer A, Martin P (2008) Synthetic biology: social and
ethical challenges. Retrieved August 29, 2009, from
University of Nottingham, Institute for Science and Society
Website: http://nottingham.academia.edu/AndrewBalmer/
Papers/51276/Synthethic-Biology-Social-and-Ethical-
Challenges
6. Benner S (2008) Biology from the bottom up. Nature
452:692–694
7. Bensaude-Vincent B (2009) Philosophy of chemistry. In:
Brenner A, Gayon J (eds) French studies in the philosophy
of science. Springer, Berlin, pp 165–186
8. Borenstein S (2007) ‘Scientists struggle to define life’, USA
Today, August 19, 2007. Retrieved September 12, 2009,
from: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-8-19-
life_N.htm
9. Brenner S (2001) My Life in science. Biomed Central,
London
10. Brockman J (2006) Constructive biology: George Church.
Edge: The third culture, June 26 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/church06/church06_
index.html
11. Brockman J (2008) Life: A gene-centric view. Craig Venter
& Richard Dawkins. A conversation in Munich. Edge: the
third culture. Retrieved September 4, 2009, from http://
www.edge.org/documents/dawkins_venter_index.html
12. Campos L (2009) That was the synthetic biology that was.
In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-Mitra A, de Vriend H
(eds) Synthetic biology: the technoscience and its societal
consequences. Springer, Berlin, pp 5–21
13. Carey J (1999) Playing God in the lab: gene pioneers are on
the threshold of creating life. Business Week, April 26,
1999. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from: http://www.
businessweek.com/archives/1999/b3626158.arc.htm
14. Carey J (2007) On the brink of artificial life. Business
Week, June 25, 2007. Retrieved September 12, 2009, from:
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_26/
b4040047.htm
15. Cho MK, Magnus D, Caplan AL, McGee D, the Ethics of
GenomicsGroup(1999)Ethicalconsiderationsinsynthesizing
a minimal genome. Science 286:2087–2090
16. Darwin E (2006 [1803]) The temple of nature: or, the
origin of society, edited by Martin Priestman. Retrieved
September 10, 2009, from www.rc.umd.edu/editions/
darwin_temple/toc.html
17. Davies P (1990) God & the new physics. Penguin Books,
London
18. Davies K (2002) Cracking the genome: inside the race to
unlock human DNA. The Free, New York
19. Davis D (2003) A tale of two creatures: Jewish and
Christian attitudes towards cloning, The Park Ridge Center
for Health, Faith and Ethics. Retrieved September 12,
2009, from: http://www.parkridgecenter.org/Page60.html
20. de Lange F (1998) Voor God spelen? Religie, ethiek en
gentechnologie [Playing God? Religion, Ethics and Gene
Technology]. Tijdschrift voor Theologie 4:394–410
Nanoethics (2009) 3:257–268 26721. de Vriend H (2006) Constructing life: early social reflections
on the emerging field of synthetic biology. (The Hague:
Rathenau Institute). Retrieved September 12, 2009, from
Rathenau Institute Web site: http//www.rathenauinstituut.
com/files/WED97%20Constructing%20Life%202006.pdf
22. Dekker C (2007) Stel grenzen aan het gesleutel aan de
mens [Put limits on tampering with human beings]. NRC
Handelsblad, November 10, 2007
23. Drees WB (2002) “Playing God? Yes!” Religion in the
light of technology. Zygon 37:643–654
24. Dupuy J-P (2008) Cybernetics is an antihumanism:
advanced technologies and the rebellion against the human
condition. The global spiral. Retrieved September 12, 2009
from http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/
10544/Default.aspx
25. Dutch Parliament (2004) Kamerstukken I 2003/04, 26 568
(R1638), B
26. Endy D (2005) Foundations for engineering biology.
Nature 238:449–453
27. ETC Group (2007) Goodbye, Dolly ... Hello, Synthia! J.
Craig Venter Institute Seeks Monopoly Patents on the
World’s First-Ever Human-Made Life Form. Retrieved
September 12, 2009, from: http://www.etcgroup.org/en/
materials/publications.html?pub_id=631
28. Forster AC, Church GM (2007) Synthetic biology projects
in vitro. Genome Res 17:1–6
29. Goodfield J (1977) Playing God: genetic engineering and
the manipulation of life. Hutchinson & Co., London
30. Gould SJ (1996) The monster’s human nature. In: Gould SJ
(ed) Dinosaur in a haystack. Cape, London, pp 53–62
31. Graham G (2002) Genes: a philosophical inquiry. Routledge,
London
32. Hefner P (1993) The human factor: evolution, culture and
religion. Augsburg Fortress, Minneapolis
33. J. Craig Venter Institute (2007) Minimal bacterial genome.
US Patent Application 20070122826, 31 May 2007 (filed
12 Oct 2006)
34. Jasanoff S (2005) Designs on nature: science and democracy
in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press,
Princeton
35. Kant I (1996) Critique of pure reason. Translated by W.S.
Pluhar. Hackett, Indianapolis 1787
36. Kearnes M (2008) Informationalising matter: systems under-
standingofthenanoscale. SpontaneousGenerations2:99–111
37. Kirkham G (2006) ‘Playing God’ and ‘vexing nature’:a
cultural perspective. Environ Values 15:173–195
38. Kirkham G (2009) Is biotechnology the new alchemy? Stud
Hist Philos Sci 40:70–80
39. Lederer S (2002) Frankenstein: penetrating the secrets of
nature. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick
40. Maienschein J (2009) Controlling life: from Jacques Loeb
to regenerative medicine. J Hist Biol 42:215–230
41. McEuen P, Dekker C (2008) Synthesizing the future. ACS
Chemical Biology 3:10–12
42. Mooney C (2002) Nothing wrong with a little Frankenstein.
Washington Post, December 1, 2002. Retrieved September
12, 2009, from: http://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/courses/
ALife/Wash%20Post%20Dec%20202002b.html
43. Nature (2007) Editorial: meanings of ‘life’: synthetic
biology provides a welcome antidote to chronic vitalism.
Nature 447:1031–1032
44. O’Malley MA, Powel A, Davies JF, Calvert J (2008)
Knowledge-making distinctions in synthetic biology.
BioEssays 30:57–65
45. Pauly PJ (1987) Controlling life. Jacques Loeb & The
engineering ideal inbiology. Oxford UniversityPress,Oxford
46. Peters T (2002) Playing God? Genetic determinism and
human freedom. Routledge, London
47. Peters T (2006) Contributions from practical theology and
ethics. In: PH Clayton, Simpson ZR (eds) The Oxford
handbook of religion and science. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp 372–387
48. Pollan M (1998) Playing God in the garden. New York
Times, 25 October 1998. Retrieved September 12, 2009,
from: http://www.michaelpollan.com/article.php?id=73
49. Reed A (2009) Designing life: a look at synthetic biology.
Retrieved September 12, 2009, from http://scienceinsociety.
northwestern.edu/content/articles/2008/medill-reports/jan/
endy/designing-life-a-look-at-synthetic-biology
50. Regalado A (2005) Biologist Venter aims to create life from
scratch. Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2005. Retrieved
September 12, 2009, from http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
05180/530330.stm
51. Rollin BE (1995) The Frankenstein syndrome: ethical and
socialissues in the geneticengineeringofanimals.Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
52. Shand H, Thomas J, Wetter KJ (2007) Playing God.
Ecologistonline, May 1, 2007
53. Shelley M (2003) Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus.
Penguin Books, London
54. Smith WJ (2005) Is the world ready for a superboy?—or a
dogboy? Dallas Morning News, November 13, 2005. Retrieved
September 12, 2009, from: http://www.discovery.org/a/3024
55. Steinz P (2002) Mrs. Frankenstein. NRC Handelsblad, June
8, 2002
56. ter Gast E (2007) Biotech pioneers: a philosophical inquiry
concerning the genetically engineered mouse. Dissertation,
Radboud University Nijmegen
57. Torreele E (2001) From Louis Pasteur to J. Craig Venter: when
biomedical scientists become bio-entrepreneurs, DND Working
Group Expert Paper, Médecins Sans Frontières, October 2001
58. Turney J (1998) Frankenstein’s footsteps: science, genetics,
and popular culture. Yale University Press, New Haven
59. van den Belt H (2009) Philosophy of biotechnology. In:
Meijers A (ed) Handbook philosophy of technology and
engineering sciences. Elsevier, Burlington, pp 1149–1188
60. Warner KD (2001) Are life patents ethical? Conflict between
Catholic social teaching and agricultural biotechnology’s
patent regime. J Agric Environ Ethics 14(3):301–319
61. White H (2006) Destruction of the family an attempt to
“Modify the very Grammar of Life” says Pope’s Vicar
General. Retrieved September 11, 2009, from www.
lifesitenews.com/ldn/2006/apr/06041306.html
62. Winner L (1977) Autonomous technology: technics-out-of-
control as a theme in political thought. MIT, Cambridge
63. Yeh BJ, Lim WA (2007) Synthetic biology: lessons from
the history of synthetic organic chemistry. Nature Chemical
Biology 3:521–525
64. Young E (2002). Venter gets go-ahead to build lifeform.
New Scientist, 21 November 2002. Retrieved September
12, 2009, from: http://www.newscientist.com/article/
dn3094-venter-gets-goahead-to-build-lifeform,html
268 Nanoethics (2009) 3:257–268